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Abstract
Time series estimates of inflation persistence incur an upward bias if shifts in the
inflation target of the central bank remain unaccounted for. Using a structural time
series approach we measure diﬀerent sorts of inflation persistence allowing for an un-
observed time-varying inflation target. Unobserved components are identified using
Kalman filtering and smoothing techniques. Posterior densities of the model parame-
ters and the unobserved components are obtained in a Bayesian framework based on
importance sampling. We find that inflation persistence, expressed by the half-life of
a shock, can range from 1 quarter in case of a cost-push shock to several years for a
shock to long-run inflation expectations or the output gap.
JEL classification: C11, C13, C22, C32, E31
Keywords: Inflation persistence, inflation target, Kalman filter, Bayesian analysis.
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Non-technical summary
It is generally accepted that - over the medium to long run - inflation is a monetary phenom-
enon, i.e. entirely determined by monetary policy. Over shorter horizons, however, various
macroeconomic shocks, including variations in economic activity or production costs, will
temporarily move inflation away from the central bank’s inflation objective. Therefore, a
profound understanding of the inflation-generating process, in particular the speed of infla-
tion adjustment in response to such shocks, is of crucial importance for a central bank whose
policy is oriented towards price stability. Inflation persistence then refers to the tendency
of inflation to converge slowly towards its long-run value in response to these shocks.
When it comes to measuring historical inflation persistence, a common practice in empir-
ical research is to estimate univariate autoregressive (AR) time series models and to measure
persistence as the sum of the estimated AR coeﬃcients. In most of these studies, inflation is
found to exhibit high to very high persistence over the post-WW II period, i.e. persistence
is found to be close to that of a random walk. This suggests that a central bank’s task
of pursuing price stability might be more complicated than if persistence were low. The
main point highlighted in this paper is that unconditional estimates of high post-WW II
inflation persistence are hard to interpret. The extent to which the estimates are aﬀected
by historical changes in the policy objective blurs the lesson that a stability-oriented central
bank can learn from them.
The data-generating process of inflation can be broken down into a number of distinct
components, each of them exhibiting its own degree of persistence. First, shifts in the central
bank’s inflation objective can induce permanent shifts in the mean inflation rate. Second,
imperfect or sticky information implies that private agents have to learn about the central
bank’s true inflation objective. As such, the inflation objective perceived by private agents
can persistently diﬀer from the central bank’s true inflation objective. Third, persistence
in the drivers of inflation also introduces persistence in the observed inflation rate. Finally,
there is intrinsic inflation persistence in response to shocks hitting inflation directly. The
latter is likely to be related to price- and wage-setting mechanisms, e.g. price and wage
indexation.
We measure the persistence in the change of the euro area and United States GDP
deflator, using a structural time series model which explicitly models the various components
driving inflation. We pursue both a univariate and a multivariate approach. By extracting
information from the central bank’s key interest rate, we find confirmation that shifts in
the central bank’s inflation objective induce a non-stationary component in the inflation
rate. Moreover, the slow adjustment of inflation expectations in response to changes in the
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central bank’s inflation objective delays the adjustment towards the new inflation objective.
Both components explain a large fraction of the high degree of persistence observed in
the post-WW II inflation rate. Persistence in the drivers of inflation is also an important
factor determining the observed inflation persistence. Taking these components into account,
intrinsic inflation persistence in both the euro area and the United States is found to be
significantly lower than the persistence of a random walk.
The implications for monetary policy are the following. Our evidence indicates that
in a stable inflation regime, where the central bank’s inflation objective does not change
and where the public perception about this inflation objective is well anchored, inflation
persistence is relatively low. The results also imply that in case monetary policy would
again give rise to unstable inflation, it would afterwards be very hard to disinflate due
to the slow adjustment of inflation expectations in response to changes in the inflation
objective.
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1 Introduction
It is generally accepted that over the medium to long run inflation is a monetary phenom-
enon, i.e. entirely determined by monetary policy. Over shorter horizons, though, various
macroeconomic shocks, including variations in economic activity or production costs, will
temporarily move inflation away from the central bank’s inflation target. Therefore, a pro-
found understanding of the process generating inflation, in particular the speed of inflation
adjustment in response to such shocks is of crucial importance for an inflation targeting cen-
tral bank. Inflation persistence then refers to the tendency of inflation to converge slowly
towards the central bank’s inflation target in response to these shocks.
With respect to measuring historical inflation persistence, a common practice in empir-
ical research is to estimate univariate autoregressive (AR) time series models and measure
persistence as the sum of the estimated AR coeﬃcients (Nelson and Plosser, 1982; Fuhrer
and Moore, 1995; Pivetta and Reis, 2004). In most of these studies, inflation is found to
exhibit high to very high persistence over the post-WW II period, i.e. persistence is found
to be close to that of a random walk. This suggests that, in order to bring inflation back to
its target level, a central bank should react more vigorously than if persistence were low.
Important to note, though, is that this estimated high persistence should be interpreted
as a measure of unconditional inflation persistence as this literature does not take into ac-
count that the data generating process of inflation is composed of a number of distinct
components, each of them exhibiting its own level of persistence. As such, there are var-
ious factors underlying measured historical inflation persistence. First, over the last four
decades large changes in the monetary policy strategy of industrialised economies have oc-
curred. This has lead to shifts in the inflation target1 of central banks, which introduces
a non-stationary component in the observed inflation series. Second, due to asymmetric
information, sticky information or imperfect credibility, private agents’ perceptions about
the central bank’s inflation target can diﬀer from the true inflation target. The persis-
tence of such deviations can be called expectations-based persistence (see Angeloni et al.,
2004). Third, the sluggish response of inflation to various macroeconomic shocks is likely
to be related to the wage- and price-setting mechanism. If wages and prices are adjusted
infrequently, they will only gradually incorporate the eﬀects of these shocks and therefore
deviations of the observed inflation rate from the perceived inflation target will persist dur-
ing several consecutive periods. This kind of inflation persistence can be called intrinsic
inflation persistence (see Angeloni et al., 2004). Also price and wage indexation, which in-
1Although inflation targeting is a monetary policy strategy that only emerged in the 1990s, we will still
use this framework for the 1970s and 1980s. It enables us to identify the implicit inflation target of central
banks from their policy choices as well as subsequent economic outcomes.
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troduces backward-lookingness into inflation, add to intrinsic inflation persistence. Fourth,
inflation persistence is determined by the persistence of the various macroeconomic shocks
hitting inflation, e.g. persistent deviations of output from its potential level. This type of
inflation persistence can be called extrinsic inflation persistence (see Angeloni et al., 2004).
In order to get a reliable estimate of the various types of inflation persistence, each of the
above mentioned components should be taken into account explicitly when constructing the
data generating process of inflation. First, permanent shifts in the central bank’s inflation
target lead to permanent changes in inflation. As standard AR models assume that inflation
has a stable mean, these shifts induce an upward bias on measured inflation persistence
(Levin and Piger, 2004). In fact, this argument goes back to Perron (1990) who pointed
out that the standard Dickey-Fuller unit root test is biased towards non-rejection of the
unit root hypothesis if the true data generating process includes breaks in its deterministic
components. Taking historical changes in the central bank’s inflation target into account
might not be straightforward, though. Contrary to the current conduct of monetary policy,
most countries typically did not directly communicate their inflation target to the public.
Second, if the central bank’s inflation target is not known to private agents or if it is not
fully credible, the inflation target perceived by economic agents might diﬀer from the central
bank’s inflation target. In this case intrinsic and extrinsic inflation persistence should be
measured as the persistence in the deviations of the actual inflation rate from the perceived
inflation target rather than from the central bank’s inflation target. Third, in order to
disentangle intrinsic and extrinsic persistence, the persistence in macroeconomic shocks
hitting inflation should be modelled as well.
In the recent literature, shifts in the central bank’s inflation target are accounted for in
three diﬀerent ways. First, O’Reilly and Whelan (2004) and Pivetta and Reis (2004) use
rolling regressions to allow for shifts in the mean of inflation over diﬀerent sub-samples.
By lowering the sub-sample size, the number of breaks that can occur is reduced. Still,
the authors cannot reject the hypothesis that the sum of the AR coeﬃcients equals 1.
Second, Levin and Piger (2004), Gadzinski and Orlandi (2004) and Bilke (2004) estimate
an AR process allowing for discrete breaks in the mean of the inflation process. Without
accounting for possible shifts, Levin and Piger (2004) report a persistence parameter for
the United States GDP deflator of 0.92 over the period 1984Q1-2003Q4. Once a structural
break is allowed for, persistence drops to 0.36. Third, Cogley and Sargent (2001, 2003), and
Benati (2004) estimate time-varying AR coeﬃcients conditional on a time-varying mean,
which is specified as a random walk process. They find evidence that the AR coeﬃcients of
inflation have dropped considerably over the last decade.
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should be stressed. First, rolling regressions do not entirely rule out the possibility that a
shift occurred in a specific sub-sample, especially when shifts are frequent. Moreover, this
approach has limits in terms of degrees of freedom. Second, capturing shifts in monetary
policy by allowing for a time-varying mean inflation rate, either by adding discrete breaks
or a random walk process to the AR model, is inappropriate if the perceived inflation target
diﬀers from the central bank’s inflation target. As this diﬀerence is not accounted for in
these models, the persistence in the deviation of the perceived inflation target from the
central bank’s inflation target is implicitly restricted to equal the average of intrinsic and
extrinsic inflation persistence.
This paper uses a structural time series approach to model the data generating process
of inflation in the euro area2 and the United States. Given the various sources of inflation
persistence, structural time series models are particularly suited as in these models a time
series can be decomposed into a number of distinct components, each of them being modelled
explicitly. We pursue both a univariate and a multivariate approach. In both approaches,
intrinsic and extrinsic inflation persistence are measured as the persistence of the devia-
tions of inflation from the perceived inflation target. In contrast to the current literature,
this allows for expectations-based persistence in response to shocks to the inflation target.
Expectations-based persistence is incorporated by modelling the perceived inflation target
as an AR process around the central bank’s inflation target, the latter being modelled as a
random walk. Kozicki and Tinsley (2003) use a similar model to disentangle permanent and
transitory monetary policy shifts. Contrary to these authors, in the multivariate model we
explicitly decompose output into potential output and a business cycle component. In this
way we can consistently disentangle intrinsic and extrinsic inflation persistence in response
to shocks to the business cycle.
As the univariate and the multivariate model both include a number of unobserved
components, they are cast in a linear Gaussian state space representation. This enables the
identification of the unobserved components from the observed data using Kalman filtering
and smoothing techniques. The unknown parameters are estimated in a Bayesian framework,
exploiting information both from the sample data and from previous studies estimating
similar models. Posterior densities of the model parameters and the unobserved components
are obtained using importance sampling.
The results indicate that intrinsic inflation persistence is not close to that of a random
walk, i.e. the sum of the AR coeﬃcients ranges from 0.45 in the euro area to 0.80 in the
United States. Considerable extrinsic persistence explains why inflation deviates from the
2Although the euro area did not exist for the larger part of our data sample (1970Q2-1998Q4), we use
synthetic data aggregating the respective national data (Fagan et al, 2005). We thus implicitly assume that
the euro area was an economy with a homogeneous monetary policy over the entire sample.
With respect to these recent contributions to the literature, the following drawbacks
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perceived inflation target during several consecutive periods. This source of persistence
corresponds to the persistence in the output gap that drives inflation. Expectations-based
persistence is estimated to be at least as high as intrinsic persistence, indicating that the
dissipation of changes in the policy target is typically slower than in case of temporary
shocks. Next to permanent changes in the central bank’s inflation target, this explains the
observed high degree of aggregate post war inflation persistence.
The implications for monetary policy are as follows. Our evidence indicates that in a
stable inflation regime, where the central bank’s inflation target does not change and where
the public perception about this inflation target is well anchored, inflation persistence is
relatively lower. The results also imply that in the case monetary policy would again give
rise to unstable inflation, it would afterwards be very hard to disinflate due to the slow
adjustment of inflation expectations in response to changes in the inflation target. In the
case of natural rate misperceptions (Orphanides and Williams, 2004) this might however
not be straightforward to avoid.
2 A structural time series approach
In this section, we present a structural time series model for inflation which takes into
account (i) possible shifts in the central bank’s inflation target, (ii) expectations-based
persistence, (iii) intrinsic persistence and (iv) extrinsic persistence. The model is identified
both in a univariate and a multivariate set-up. The univariate approach relies on time series
data for inflation only. In the multivariate model, we add information contained in real
output and the central bank’s key interest rate. Using a variant of the macroeconomic model
of Rudebusch and Svensson (1999), this allows us to impose more economic structure on the
identification process. The advantage of the univariate over the multivariate model is that
its relative simplicity reduces the risk of specification errors. The state space representation
of both models is given in section 3.
2.1 Baseline structural model
The baseline structural model is given by:
πTt+1 = π
T
t + η1t, (1)
πPt+1 = Et+1π
T
t+1, (2)
πt = (1−
Xq
i=1
ϕi)π
P
t +
Xq
i=1
ϕiL
iπt + β1zt−1 + ε1t,
Xq
i=1
ϕi < 1, (3)
where πTt is the central bank’s inflation target, π
P
t is the perceived inflation target, πt is the
observed inflation rate and zt is the output gap, i.e. the percentage deviation of real output
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from potential output. L is the lag operator so that Liπt = πt−i. ε1t and η1t are mutually
independent zero mean white noise processes.
Equation (1) specifies πTt as a random walk process, i.e. shifts in the central bank’s infla-
tion target are assumed to be permanent. These shifts can be thought of as representing (i)
changes in the central bank’s preferences over alternative inflation outcomes (see Andolfatto
et al., 2002) or (ii) an implicit change in the inflation target of the central bank created by
misperceptions about the natural rate of diﬀerent real variables (Orphanides and Williams,
2004)
Shifts in πTt are unlikely to be passed on to inflation expectations immediately. Castel-
nuovo et al. (2003) present data on long-run inflation expectations. These suggest that in
the aftermath of shifts in monetary policy, convergence towards the new equilibrium evolves
smoothly over time. In the literature, this is often attributed to asymmetric information
and signal extraction, sticky information or imperfect credibility. The source of asymmetric
information on behalf of the private agents can be due to a lack of knowledge about the
central bank’s inflation target (Kozicki and Tinsley, 2003) or uncertainty about the central
bank’s preferences of inflation over real activity (Cukierman and Meltzer, 1986; Tetlow and
von zur Muehlen, 2001). If private agents have to extract information about the central
bank’s inflation target from a monetary policy rule, the signal-to-noise ratio of this policy
rule determines the uncertainty faced by private agents in disentangling transitory and per-
manent policy shocks and therefore also the speed at which they recognise permanent policy
shocks (Erceg and Levin, 2003). Further, even if the central bank clearly announces a new
inflation target, it can take quite some time before the new policy target is incorporated into
long-run inflation expectations of private agents (for evidence see Castelnuovo et al., 2003).
This might be due to costs of acquiring information and/or re-optimisation (Mankiw and
Reis, 2002). Summing up, private agents must form expectations about the inflation target
πTt . Therefore, equation (2) introduces the perceived inflation target π
P
t , which captures
the private agents’ beliefs about the central bank’s inflation target πTt .
The expectations operator in equation (2) is operationalised by modelling πPt+1 as a
weighted average of πPt and π
T
t+1,
πPt+1 = (1− δ)πPt + δπTt+1 + η2t, 0 < δ ≤ 1, (4)
where η2t is a zero mean white noise process. The weighting parameter δ can be interpreted
as being the information updating parameter λ in a variant of the sticky-information model
of Mankiw and Reis (2002) or as being proportional to the Kalman gain parameter kg in
the signal extraction problem of Erceg and Levin (2003) and Andolfatto et al. (2002).3
3See appendix 1 for more details on how equation (4) can be derived from these two models.
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Consequently, δ measures the speed at which changes in the central bank’s inflation target
aﬀect long-run inflation expectations of private agents, i.e. δ measures expectations-based
persistence. If δ is one, a shift in the central bank’s inflation target is immediately and
completely passed on to inflation expectations. This would be the case if the central bank’s
inflation target is perfectly known to all private agents and immediately credible. The
smaller δ, the slower expectations respond to a shift in the central bank’s inflation target.4
In the sticky-information model of Mankiw and Reis (2002), δ decreases in the cost of
acquiring information and/or the cost of re-optimising prices in response to a shift in the
central bank’s inflation target. In the signal extraction problem of Erceg and Levin (2003)
and Andolfatto et al. (2002), δ increases in the signal-to-noise ratio of the monetary policy
rule, i.e. the lower the uncertainty about whether monetary policy signals reflect transitory
rather than permanent policy changes, the faster private agents will react to these signals
by updating their inflation expectations.5
Note that shocks to the perceived inflation target, η2, only have a short-run impact
on πP . These shocks should be interpreted as misperceptions of private agents about the
central bank’s inflation target, due to for instance noise in the signal extraction problem of
Erceg and Levin (2003) and Andolfatto et al. (2002). Shocks to the central bank’s inflation
target, η1, have a unit long-run impact on π
P , i.e. πT is the long-run equilibrium inflation
rate. This is consistent with the generally accepted feature that long-run inflation is a purely
monetary phenomenon.
Equation (3) is a Phillips curve, relating the observed inflation rate πt to the perceived
inflation target πPt , q lags of inflation and the lagged output gap zt−1. The perceived inflation
target πPt is the inflation rate consistent with the private agents’ inflation expectations.
Therefore, it serves as the medium-run inflation anchor. Both business cycle shocks, reflected
in the output gap zt−1, as well as cost-push shocks, measured by ε1t, hitting inflation induce
temporary deviations of πt from πPt . The sluggish adjustment of πt in response to cost-push
shocks ε1t is measured by the sum of the AR coeﬃcients,
Pq
i=1 ϕi. This intrinsic inflation
persistence is likely to be related to price- and wage-setting mechanisms, e.g. price and
wage indexation. The sluggish adjustment of πt in response to business cycle shocks is
determined, besides the intrinsic inflation persistence, by the persistence of the output gap
zt in response to business cycle shocks. The latter source of inflation persistence can be
called extrinsic inflation persistence.
4We do not allow δ to take a value of 0, as in this case πPt does not react to monetary policy shocks, i.e.
monetary policy is not credible. Note that this restriction does not imply that all monetary policy actions
are fully credible. Rather, only credible shifts in the central bank’s inflation target are included in η1t.
5Equation (4) does not distinguish between these two theories, neither excludes that δ is a weighted
average of kg and λ, which could be the case if reality is a mixture of both theories.
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composed of the perceived inflation target and a temporary component. Rather, shifts in
πPt are only slowly passed on to observed inflation, with the speed of convergence being
determined by the degree of intrinsic inflation persistence. In this way, we assume that
in case of a shift in the perceived inflation target the structural determinants for intrinsic
persistence, e.g. price and wage indexation, are present in addition to the determinants of
expectations-based persistence, e.g. sticky or imperfect information.
2.2 Univariate identification
In a first step, we use time series data on inflation only to estimate the model specified
in equations (1)-(4). Given the limited information set, the baseline model is simplified in
two respects. First, we set β1 = 0 in equation (3). This restriction stems from the fact
that we do not include any information about real output and therefore cannot disentangle
intrinsic from extrinsic inflation persistence in response to business cycle shocks. Second,
we exclude the possibility of shocks to πPt , i.e. η2t = 0 ∀t. This restriction is motivated
from the concern to keep, given the limited information set, the identification of πPt and π
T
t
as simple as possible. Under this restriction, equation (4) can be rewritten, using equation
(1), as:
πPt+1 = (2− δ)πPt + (δ − 1)πPt−1 + δη1t (5)
This way of writing equation (4) shows that the univariate identification scheme boils
down to the empirical restriction that (i) shocks to the central bank’s inflation target, η1t,
have a unit long-run impact on observed inflation, (ii) inflation expectations can deviate from
the central bank’s inflation target over a long period of time and (iii) observed inflation is
a stationary AR process around the perceived inflation target. Note that equation (5) is
broadly consistent with the idea advocated by, among others, Young et al. (1991), that in
order to introduce enough smoothness in estimates of unobserved trend components, they
are best modelled as an integrated random walk process. Although strictly speaking the
data generating process for πPt is not allowed to be an integrated random walk process, as
δ > 0, πPt will exhibit a similar smoothness in response to monetary policy shocks provided
that δ is suﬃciently close to 0. A similar specification of the data generating process of
inflation expectations can be found in Doménech and Gomez (2003).
2.3 Multivariate identification
The univariate model exhibits two main drawbacks. First, identification of shocks to the
central bank’s inflation target stems from the purely statistical restriction that these shocks
should have a unit long-run impact on inflation. Second, intrinsic and extrinsic inflation
Note that equation (3) does not impose that the observed inflation series is additively
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persistence cannot be disentangled. Therefore, we add data on the central bank’s key
interest rate and real output. We use a variant of the widely used macroeconomic model
of Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) to (i) identify the central bank’s inflation target from
information contained in the central bank’s key interest rate and (ii) to measure extrinsic
inflation persistence in response to shocks to the output gap from information contained in
real output. Therefore, the baseline specification in equations (1)-(4) is extended with the
following equations:
it = ρ2it−1 + (1− ρ2)
¡
r∗t + π
P
t
¢
+ ρ1(πt−1 − πTt ) + ε2t (6)
yrt = y
P
t + zt (7)
zt = β2zt−1 + β3zt−2 − β4
¡
it−1 − πPt−1 − r∗t−1
¢
+ ε3t (8)
yPt+1 = λt+1 + y
P
t + η3t (9)
λt+1 = λt + η4t (10)
r∗t+1 = γλt+1 + τ t+1 (11)
τ t+1 = θτ t + η5t (12)
where ε2t, ε3t, η3t, η4t and η5t are mutually independent zero mean white noise processes.
The interest rate rule in equation (6) infers on the stance of monetary policy through
comparing the central bank’s key nominal interest rate, it, with a measure for the neutral
stance of monetary policy. Following Laubach and Williams (2003), this measure is assumed
to be the natural short-run nominal interest rate
¡
r∗t + π
P
t
¢
, where r∗t is the time-varying
real short-term interest rate consistent with output equal to potential (cf. below). As the
perceived inflation target πPt is the medium-run inflation anchor consistent with long-run
inflation expectations, r∗t +π
P
t is the medium-run nominal interest rate anchor for monetary
policy. The term (πt−1 − πTt ) captures the reaction of the central bank to deviations of
inflation from its target, i.e. monetary authorities will increase the nominal interest rate
it when observed inflation πt−1 lies above the inflation target πTt . The lagged interest rate
it−1 introduces a degree of nominal interest rate smoothing or policy inertia (Amato and
Laubach, 1999; English et al., 2003; Erceg and Levin, 2003). We assume that the policy
parameters ρ1 and ρ2 are time-invariant. Although Clarida et al. (1998) find that the policy
parameters are unstable in a number of countries, this assumption is not in contradiction
with their results. They estimate the parameters conditional on a constant inflation target,
whereas we estimate the inflation target conditional on constant policy parameters. Both
strategies are to a high degree observationally equivalent. The reason why we do so is that
we are interested in the time-varying inflation target and less in the policy parameters. For
examples of the same approach see e.g. Kozicki and Tinsley (2003) or Smets and Wouters
(2005).
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The interest rate rule enables us to extract information on shifts in the monetary policy
regime contained in the key nominal interest rate it. Figures 1 and 2 present data for key
nominal interest rates and inflation in the euro area and the United States since 1970. For a
given fully credible central bank inflation target, inflation and the key nominal interest rate
it should, over an entire business cycle, move around a fixed point on a 45 degree line with
an intercept equal to the equilibrium real interest rate. This 45 degree line corresponds to
the sum of the natural real interest rate and the perceived inflation target πPt , that equals
the credible central bank inflation target πTt . However, the seven year moving average line
of the data, which approximately filters out business cycle fluctuations, shows that from
the 1970s until now inflation and interest rates did not move around a fixed point. This
suggests that there have been substantial shifts in the central bank’s inflation target.
Figure 1: Shifts in the inflation target (euro area). Notes: a) The intercept is the mean of
the real interest rate in the sample 1970Q2-2003Q4. b) As the sample begins in 1970Q2,
the moving average will only start to contain seven years of data from 1977Q2. Therefore,
the average is a slightly more volatile in the beginning of the sample.
The same figures also reveal to what extent the perceived inflation target diﬀered from
the central bank’s inflation target at a certain point in time. Suppose we start from a point
on the 45 degree line, e.g. a high inflation rate and a high key interest rate in the early
1980s. Now consider a central bank that wants to disinflate, i.e. the central bank reduces
its target πTt . If the shift in π
T
t immediately feeds through into π
P
t , we would observe
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Figure 2: Shifts in the inflation target (United States). Notes: See figure 1.
a contemporaneous decrease in the key interest rate. Graphically, this would correspond
to a downward shift along the 45 degree line. As this is neither the case for the United
States nor for the euro area in most of the sample, this shows that changes in the central
bank’s inflation target are usually only slowly reflected in the perceived inflation target.
The only time this observation seems not to hold is for the period between 1994 and today
in the United States. It suggests that during the last decade, the Federal Reserve was
able to disinflate in a credible way by about 2 percentage points6. Note that, as Laubach
and Williams (2003) point out, shifts in the natural real rate of interest could mislead our
judgement of the stance of monetary policy if we would assume that the natural rate remains
constant. Time variation in the natural rate implies that the intercepts in Figures 1 and
2 are also time-varying. Still it is hard to believe that the natural rate of interest was
persistently lower in the seventies than in the eighties and nineties, which lets us conclude
that the interest rate rule indeed contains information about the timing and magnitude of
shifts in the central bank’s inflation target.
Equation (7) decomposes the log of real output yrt into potential output y
P
t and the
output gap zt. Equation (8) is an aggregate demand equation, relating the output gap zt to
6This seems to be confirmed by narrative evidence. Goodfriend (2002) writes: "... in February 1994,
the Fed started to announce its current intended federal funds rate target immediately after each FOMC
meeting. This new practice made Fed policy more visible than ever. Every increase in the federal funds rate
since then has attracted considerable attention."
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its own lags and a term
¡
it−1 − πPt−1 − r∗t−1
¢
which captures monetary policy transmission.
Following Harvey (1985), Stock and Watson (1998) and Laubach and Williams (2003),
equations (9)-(10) model potential output as a random walk with drift, where the drift term
λt varies over time according to a random walk process. The time-variation in λt allows for
the possibility of permanent changes in the trend growth of real output, e.g. the productivity
slowdown of the early 1970s.7
Laubach and Williams (2003) argue that the natural real rate of interest varies over time
due to shifts in the trend growth of output and other factors such as households’ rate of
time preference. Therefore, equation (11) relates the real short-term interest rate r∗t to the
trend growth in potential output λt and a component τ t that captures other determinants
like time preferences. τ t is assumed to be an AR process that, depending on the value for
θ, can be either stationary or non-stationary.
Because we want to measure inflation persistence as the sum of the coeﬃcients on the
lagged inflation terms, the non-expectational autoregressive model presented above suits
our purpose very well. In the case the economy is characterised by forward looking rational
expectations, it can be considered as its reduced form representation. Rudebusch (2005),
however, shows that in that case the reduced form representation of a simple forward looking
monetary policy model would be subject to the Lucas critique. In this context Lansing and
Trehan (2003) analytically show that the reduced form parameters depend on the policy
parameters ρ1 and ρ2. This is not relevant for our extension, though, as we model the
economy in a reduced form around a time varying steady state inflation rate. The policy
parameters ρ1 and ρ2 remain constant and therefore the reduced form parameters are not
aﬀected by policy changes.
3 Estimation methodology8
3.1 State space representation
The structural time series models outlined in section 2 both include a number of unobserved
components (πPt , π
T
t , ...). In order to estimate these models, it is necessary to write them into
state space form9. In a state space model, the development over time of the system under
study is determined by an unobserved series of vectors α1, . . . , αn, which are associated with
7Note that the random walk in equation (10) implies that yPt , and therefore also yt, is an I(2) process.
This seems inconsistent with the empirical evidence from Dickey-Fuller (DF) unit root tests that real output
is I(1). Stock and Watson (1998) argue, though, that when the variance of η4t is small relative to the variance
of η3t, ∆yPt has a moving average (MA) root close to unity. Schwert (1989) and Pantula (1991) show that
the size of the standard DF unit root test is severely upwards biased in the presence of a large MA root.
In this case, the standard DF unit root test is inappropriate to pick up a possible I(2) component in real
output.
8The methodology outlined in this section was implemented using a set of GAUSS procedures. The code
of these procedures is available from the authors on request.
9 See e.g. Durbin and Koopman (2001) for an extensive overview of state space methods.
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a series of observed vectors y1, . . . , yn. A general linear Gaussian state space model can be
written in the following form:
yt = Zαt +Axt + εt, εt ∼ N(0,H), (13)
αt+1 = Tαt +Rηt, ηt ∼ N(0,Q), t = 1, . . . , n, (14)
where yt is a p × 1 vector of observed endogenous variables, modelled in the observation
equation (13), xt is a k× 1 vector of observed exogenous variables and αt is a m× 1 vector
of unobserved states, modelled in the state equation (14). The disturbances εt and ηt are
assumed to be independent sequences of independent normal vectors. The matrices Z, A,
T, R, H, and Q are parameter matrices.10
3.2 Kalman filter and smoother
Assuming that Z, A, T, R, H, and Q are known, the purpose of state space analysis is
to infer the relevant properties of the αt’s from the observations y1, . . . , yn and x1, . . . , xn.
This can be done through the subsequent use of two recursions, i.e. the Kalman filter and
the Kalman smoother. The objective of filtering is to obtain the distribution of αt, for
t = 1, . . . , n, conditional on Yt and Xt, where Yt = {y1, . . . , yt} and Xt = {x1, . . . , xt} . In a
linear Gaussian state space model, the distribution of αt is entirely determined by the filtered
state vector at = E (αt | Yt,Xt) and the filtered state variance matrix Pt = V ar (αt | Yt,Xt) .
The (contemporaneous) Kalman filter algorithm (see e.g. Hamilton, 1994, or Durbin and
Koopman, 2001) estimates at and Pt by updating, at time t, at−1 and Pt−1 using the new
information contained in yt and xt. The Kalman filter recursion can be initialised by the
assumption that α1 ∼ N(a1, P1). In practice, a1 and P1 are generally not known though.
Therefore, we assume that the distribution of the initial state vector α1 is
α1 = V Γ+R0η0, η0 ∼ N (0, Q0) , Γ ∼ N (0, κIr) , (15)
where the m× r matrix V and the m× (m− r) matrix R0 are selection matrices composed
of columns of the identity matrix Im. They are defined so that, when taken together, their
columns constitute all the columns of Im and V 0R0 = 0. The matrix Q0 is assumed to be
positive definite and known. The r × 1 vector Γ is a vector of unknown random quantities,
referred to as the diﬀuse vector as we let κ→∞. This leads to
α1 ∼ N(0, P1), P1 = κP∞ + P∗, (16)
where P∞ = V V 0 and P∗ = R0Q0R00. The Kalman filter is modified to account for this
diﬀuse initialisation implied by letting κ → ∞ by using the exact initial Kalman filter
10The exact elements of the vectors yt, xt and αt and the matrices Z, A, T, R, H, and Q for both the
univariate and the multivariate model are specified in appendix 2.
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introduced by Ansley and Kohn (1985) and further developed by Koopman (1997) and
Koopman and Durbin (2003).
Subsequently, the Kalman smoother algorithm is used to estimate the distribution of αt,
for t = 1, . . . , n, conditional on Yn and Xn, where Yn = {y1, . . . , yn} and Xn = {x1, . . . , xn}.
Thus, the smoothed state vector bat = E (αt | Yn,Xn) and the smoothed state variance
matrix bPt = V ar (αt | Yn,Xn) are estimated using all the observations for t = 1, . . . , n. In
order to account for the diﬀuse initialisation of α1, we use the exact initial state smoothing
algorithm suggested by Koopman and Durbin (2003).
Given the complexity of the multivariate model, we do not use the entire observational
vector yt in the filtering and smoothing algorithm. Following Koopman and Durbin (2000),
the elements of yt are introduced into the filtering and smoothing algorithms one at a
time, i.e. the multivariate analysis is converted into a univariate analysis. As the data can
then be analysed in univariate form, this approach oﬀers significant computational gains,
particularly for the treatment of initialisation by diﬀuse priors.
3.3 Bayesian analysis
The filtering and smoothing algorithms both require that Z, A, T, R, H, and Q are known.
In practice, these matrices generally depend on elements of an unknown parameter vector
ψ. One possible approach is to derive, from the exact Kalman filter, the diﬀuse loglikeli-
hood function for the model under study (see de Jong, 1991; Koopman and Durbin, 2000;
Durbin and Koopman, 2001) and replace the unknown parameter vector ψ by its maximum
likelihood estimate. This is not the approach pursued in this paper. First, given the fairly
large number of unknown parameters, especially in the multivariate model, the numerical
optimisation of the sample loglikelihood function becomes quite cumbersome. Second, most
of the unknown parameters in ψ have been estimated in the past for diﬀerent countries and
samples. Therefore, we analyse the state space models from a Bayesian point of view, i.e.
we treat ψ as a random parameter vector with a known prior density p (ψ) and estimate the
posterior densities p (ψ | y, x) for the parameter vector ψ and p (bαt | y, x) for the smoothed
state vector bαt, where y and x denote the stacked vectors (y01, . . . , y0n)0 and (x01, . . . , x0n)0
respectively, by combining information contained in p (ψ) and the sample data. Essentially,
this boils down to calculating the posterior mean g:
g = E [g (ψ) | y, x] =
Z
g (ψ) p (ψ | y, x) dψ (17)
where g is a function which expresses the moments of the posterior densities p (ψ | y, x) and
p (bαt | y, x) in terms of the parameter vector ψ.
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As p (ψ | y, x) is not a density with known analytical properties, equation (17) is evalu-
ated using importance sampling. The idea behind this simulation approach is to obtain a
sequence ψ(1), . . . , ψ(n) of n random vectors from a density g (ψ | y, x) which is as close to
p (ψ | y, x) as possible. Such a density is known as an importance density for p (ψ | y, x).
As an importance density g (ψ | y, x), we take a large sample normal approximation to
p (ψ | y, x), i.e.
g (ψ | y, x) = N
³bψ, bΩ´ (18)
where bψ is the mode of p (ψ | y, x) obtained from maximising
log p (ψ | y, x) = log p (y | ψ) + log p (ψ)− log p (y) (19)
with respect to bψ and where bΩ denotes the variance-covariance matrix of bψ and p (y | ψ) is
given by the likelihood function derived from the exact Kalman filter. Note that we do not
need to calculate p (y) as it does not depend on ψ.
By Bayes’ theorem and after some manipulations, equation (17) can be rewritten as
g =
R
g (ψ) zg (ψ, y, x) g (ψ | y, x) dψR
zg (ψ, y, x) g (ψ | y, x) dψ (20)
with
zg (ψ, y, x) =
p (ψ) p (y | ψ)
g (ψ | y, x) (21)
Using a sample of n independent draws of ψ, denoted by ψ(i), from g (ψ | y, x) , an
estimate gn of g can be obtained as
gn =
Ã nX
i=1
g
³
ψ(i)
´
zg
³
ψ(i), y, x
´!
/
Ã nX
i=1
zg
³
ψ(i), y, x
´!
(22)
Geweke (1989) shows that if g (ψ | y, x) is proportional to p (ψ | y, x) , and under a number
of weak regularity conditions, gn will be a consistent estimate of g for n→∞. In drawing
from g (ψ | y, x) , eﬃciency was improved by the use of antithetic variables, i.e. for each ψ(i)
we take another value eψ(i) = 2bψ − ψ(i), which is equiprobable with ψ(i). This results in a
simulation sample that is balanced for location (Durbin and Koopman, 2001).
4 Estimation results
We use quarterly data for the euro area and the United States from 1970Q1 to 2003Q4. The
inflation series πt is the annualised first diﬀerence of the log of the seasonally adjusted GDP
deflator. For the interest rate, it, we use the annualised central bank key interest rate. This
interest rate should be most appropriate to infer changes in the central bank’s behaviour.
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Real output, yrt , is measured as the log of seasonally adjusted GDP at constant prices. See
appendix 3 for a more detailed data description. Given that we work with quarterly data,
the number of AR terms in equation (3) is set equal to 4, i.e. q = 4.
4.1 Prior information
Prior information about the unknown parameter vector ψ is included in the analysis through
the prior density p (ψ). Where possible, prior information is taken from the literature11 . If
no adequate information is available, we leave considerable uncertainty around the chosen
priors. The prior distribution is assumed to be Gaussian for all elements in ψ, except for
the variance parameters which are assumed to be gamma distributed.
Univariate model The priors for the AR coeﬃcients ϕi in the univariate model are
chosen from studies allowing for a break in the mean of the inflation rate. Levin and Piger
(2004) for instance find a value of 0.36 for the sum of the AR coeﬃcients of the United
States GDP deflator. Gadzinski and Orlandi (2004) find a somewhat higher figure of 0.6
for the euro area. Finally we choose a prior for the sum of the AR coeﬃcients of 0.4 for
both the United States and the euro area. Our prior for δ is 0.15, which is the average of
the parameter values determining signal extraction in Erceg and Levin (2003) and Kozicki
and Tinsley (2003), or sticky information in Mankiw and Reis (2002). The prior for the
variance of the inflation target shocks σ2η1 corresponds, on average, to what Kozicki and
Tinsley (2003) and Smets and Wouters (2005) find. As at this stage we want to stay quite
agnostic about the time series characteristics of inflation, we leave the uncertainty around
the priors high and take the same priors for both the euro area and the United States.
Multivariate model The priors for the multivariate model come from previous studies
estimating variants of the model of Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) as well as the posterior
distribution of the univariate model. As a prior for the AR coeﬃcients we chose the posterior
means of the univariate model for the euro area and the United States, allowing for more
uncertainty than the univariate posterior distributions suggest. The priors for δ, σ2ε1 and
σ2η1 also correspond to the posterior means of the univariate model. For the impact of
the lagged output gap on inflation we choose a value of 0.2. The AR coeﬃcients of the
output gap equation are chosen in order to generate a hump-shaped response of output
in reaction to a shock. This feature is often found in previous empirical studies (Gerlach
and Smets, 1999; Rudebusch and Svensson, 1999; Rudebusch, 2005; Laubach and Williams,
2003). The parameter value for ρ2 assumes considerable interest rate smoothing (Smets and
11References to the source of prior information for the individual elements of ψ can be found in Tables
1-4.
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Table 1: Parameter estimates univariate model (euro area; 1971Q2:2003Q4)a
Prior Prior distributionc Posterior distribution
reference(s)b 5 p.c. Mean 95 p.c. 5 p.c. Mean 95 p.c.
ϕ1 - 0.04 0.20 0.36 0.14 0.25 0.36
ϕ2 - −0.06 0.10 0.26 −0.00 0.11 0.22
ϕ3 - 0.01 0.05 0.09 −0.01 0.03 0.07
ϕ4 - 0.01 0.05 0.09 0.02 0.06 0.10P4
i=1 ϕi [19],[32] 0.16 0.40 0.64 0.29 0.45 0.61
δ [16],[29],[33] 0.07 0.15 0.23 0.14 0.20 0.26
σ2ε1 - 0.35 1.30 2.70 1.40 1.72 2.12
σ2η1 [29],[43] 0.01 0.12 0.36 0.10 0.20 0.41
Notes: a All variances are expressed at annual rates.
b The numbers refer to the numbers in the list of references.
c The prior distribution is assumed to be Gaussian for all elements in ψ, except
for the variance parameters which are assumed to be gamma distributed.
Wouters, 2005). The parameter values for ρ1 and ρ2 are chosen so that the Taylor (1993)
principle
³
1 + ρ11−ρ2
= 1.5 > 1
´
holds for deviations of πPt from π
T
t . The central bank reacts
less vigorously
³
ρ1
1−ρ2
= 0.5
´
in response to deviations of πt from πTt . This is consistent
with the view that an inflation-targeting central bank should only stabilise inflation in the
medium run and pay less attention to short-term deviations.
4.2 Posterior distributions
In this section we present estimates of the posterior mean ψ = E [ψ | y, x] of the parameter
vector ψ and the posterior mean αt = E [bαt | y, x] of the smoothed state vector bαt. An
estimate eψ of ψ is obtained by setting g ³ψ(i)´ = ψ(i) in equation (22) and taking eψ = gn.
An estimate eαt of αt is obtained by setting g ³ψ(i)´ = bα(i)t in equation (22) and takingeαt = gn, where bα(i)t is the smoothed state vector obtained from the Kalman smoother using
the parameter vector ψ(i).
We also present the 5th and 95th percentiles of the posterior densities p (ψ | y, x) and
p (bαt | y, x). Let F ¡ψj | y, x¢ = Pr³ψ(i)j ≤ ψj´ with ψj denoting the j-th element in ψ. An
estimate eF ¡ψj | y, x¢ of F ¡ψj | y, x¢ is obtained by setting g ³ψ(i)´ = Ij ³ψ(i)j ´ in equation
(22) and taking eF ¡ψj | y, x¢ = gn, where Ij ³ψ(i)j ´ is an indicator function which equals
one if ψ(i)j ≤ ψj and zero otherwise. An estimate eψ5%j of the 5th percentile of the posterior
density p (ψ | y, x) is chosen such that eF ³ψ5%j | y, x´ = 0.05. An estimate eα5%j,t of the 5th
percentile of the jth element of the posterior density p (bαt | y, x) is obtained by setting
g
³
ψ(i)
´
= bα(i)j,t − 1.645qbP (i)j,t in equation (22) and taking eα5%j,t = gn, where bα(i)j,t denotes the
j-th element in bα(i)t and bP (i)j,t is the (j, j)th element of the smoothed state variance matrixbP (i)t obtained using the parameter vector ψ(i). The 95th percentiles are constructed in a
similar way.
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Table 2: Parameter estimates multivariate model (euro area; 1971Q2:2003Q4)a
Prior Prior distributionc Posterior distribution
reference(s)b 5 p.c. Mean 95 p.c. 5 p.c. Mean 95 p.c.
ϕ1 univariate euro area 0.09 0.25 0.41 0.17 0.27 0.38
ϕ2 univariate euro area −0.06 0.11 0.27 0.01 0.11 0.21
ϕ3 univariate euro area −0.13 0.03 0.20 −0.17 −0.07 0.03
ϕ4 univariate euro area −0.11 0.06 0.22 0.06 0.16 0.26P4
i=1 ϕi univariate euro area 0.12 0.45 0.78 0.28 0.47 0.66
δ univariate euro area 0.03 0.20 0.36 0.14 0.26 0.38
β1 [40],[41],[21] 0.18 0.20 0.22 0.18 0.20 0.22
β2 [40],[41],[21] 1.32 1.35 1.38 1.33 1.36 1.40
β3 [40],[41],[21] −0.50 −0.47 −0.44 −0.48 −0.45 −0.42
β4 [40],[41],[21] −0.01 0.15 0.31 0.10 0.15 0.21
ρ1 [45] 0.02 0.05 0.08 0.02 0.04 0.06
ρ2 [45],[43] 0.87 0.90 0.93 0.87 0.90 0.92
γ [31] 0.92 1.00 1.08 0.91 0.99 1.07
θ [31] 0.95 0.97 0.99 0.95 0.97 0.99
σ2ε1 univariate euro area 0.47 1.72 3.58 1.30 1.59 1.96
σ2ε2 - 0.21 0.30 0.41 0.25 0.30 0.36
σ2ε3 [31] 0.11 0.16 0.22 0.08 0.11 0.15
σ2η1 univariate euro area 0.05 0.20 0.42 0.07 0.15 0.30
σ2η2 - 3.e−5 1.e−4 2.e−4 1.e−5 5.e−5 2.e−4
σ2η3 [31] 4.07 5.86 7.88 2.40 3.04 4.16
σ2η4 [31] 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
σ2η5 [31] 0.07 0.10 0.14 0.07 0.11 0.14
Notes: see table 1.
4.2.1 Posterior distribution of the parameters
Tables 1-4 present the posterior mean and the 5th and 95th percentile of the posterior distri-
bution of ψ for the euro area and the United States for both the univariate and multivariate
model. Two important conclusions stand out. First, in the univariate model the combina-
tion12 of intrinsic and extrinsic inflation persistence, measured as
Xq
i=1
ϕi, amounts to 0.45
for the euro area and 0.67 for the United States. This is considerably lower than estimates
from standard AR time series models. The multivariate intrinsic inflation persistence esti-
mates amount to 0.48 and 0.80 for the euro area and the United States, and are in line with
the results of the univariate specification. In the case of the United States, intrinsic inflation
persistence is somewhat higher than in the euro area. Note that this result is consistent
with Galí et al. (2001), who for the United States also find a relatively higher degree of
backward-lookingness compared to the euro area. Second, expectations-based persistence,
measured by (1− δ) , is at least as high or higher than intrinsic inflation persistence, i.e.
higher than 0.75 for both economies across the diﬀerent models. The persistence in the
12Note that since we can not disentagle intrinsic from extrinsic persistence in the univariate model, the
AR coeﬃcients measure a combination of both.
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Table 3: Parameter estimates univariate model (United States; 1971Q2:2003Q4)a
Prior Prior distributionc Posterior distribution
reference(s)b 5 p.c. Mean 95 p.c. 5 p.c. Mean 95 p.c.
ϕ1 - 0.04 0.20 0.36 0.24 0.36 0.50
ϕ2 - −0.06 0.10 0.26 0.07 0.19 0.31
ϕ3 - 0.01 0.05 0.09 0.02 0.06 0.10
ϕ4 - 0.01 0.05 0.09 0.02 0.06 0.10P4
i=1 ϕi [19],[32] 0.16 0.40 0.64 0.47 0.67 0.87
δ [16],[29],[33] 0.07 0.15 0.23 0.11 0.18 0.26
σ2ε1 - 0.36 1.30 2.68 1.10 1.36 1.68
σ2η1 [29],[43] 0.01 0.12 0.36 0.03 0.13 0.38
Notes: see table 1.
Table 4: Parameter estimates multivariate model (United States; 1971Q2:2003Q4)a
Prior Prior distributionc Posterior distribution
reference(s)b 5 p.c. Mean 95 p.c. 5 p.c. Mean 95 p.c.
ϕ1 univariate US 0.20 0.36 0.53 0.27 0.36 0.46
ϕ2 univariate US 0.02 0.19 0.35 0.08 0.17 0.25
ϕ3 univariate US −0.10 0.06 0.22 0.04 0.13 0.22
ϕ4 univariate US −0.11 0.06 0.22 0.06 0.13 0.21P4
i=1 ϕi univariate US 0.34 0.67 1.00 0.68 0.79 0.91
δ univariate US 0.02 0.18 0.35 0.07 0.21 0.35
β1 [40],[41],[21] 0.18 0.20 0.22 0.19 0.20 0.22
β2 [40],[41],[21] 1.32 1.35 1.38 1.33 1.36 1.39
β3 [40],[41],[21] −0.50 −0.47 −0.44 −0.48 −0.46 −0.43
β4 [40],[41],[21] −0.01 0.15 0.31 0.11 0.15 0.22
ρ1 [45] 0.02 0.05 0.08 0.03 0.05 0.07
ρ2 [45], [43] 0.87 0.90 0.93 0.85 0.88 0.91
γ [31] 0.92 1.00 1.08 0.99 1.00 1.01
θ [31] 0.95 0.97 0.99 0.95 0.97 0.98
σ2ε1 univariate US 0.37 1.36 2.83 1.07 1.19 1.35
σ2ε2 - 0.21 0.30 0.41 0.61 0.69 0.79
σ2ε3 [31] 0.11 0.16 0.22 0.11 0.14 0.17
σ2η1 univariate US 0.03 0.13 0.26 0.07 0.09 0.11
σ2η2 - 7.e−5 1.e−4 1.e−4 7.e−5 1.e−4 1.e−4
σ2η3 [31] 4.07 5.86 7.88 4.40 5.28 6.39
σ2η4 [31] 4.e−3 0.01 0.02 6.e−3 8.e−3 9.e−3
σ2η5 [31] 0.01 0.10 0.31 0.29 0.36 0.44
Notes: see table 1.
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output gap, measured by the sum of β2 and β3, amounts to at least 0.9. This implies
considerable extrinsic inflation persistence.
4.2.2 Posterior distribution of the states
Figures 3, 4, 5 and 6 show the dynamics of the inflation rate together with the central bank’s
inflation target and the perceived inflation target. These figures reveal considerable variation
in the central bank’s inflation target in both the euro area and the United States. The
dynamics of the perceived inflation target show that inflation expectations adjust smoothly
in response to shifts in the central bank’s inflation target. The central bank’s inflation target
and the perceived inflation target identified in the univariate model are very similar to the
ones identified in the multivariate model. This confirms that the permanent shifts in the
perceived inflation target identified in the univariate model are indeed driven by shifts in
the central bank’s inflation target.
Figure 3: Smoothed univariate states (euro area)
The timing of the shifts in the central bank’s inflation target seems to be in line with
common knowledge about the historical conduct of monetary policy. A first disinflationary
period is present in the early 1980s. In the United States, the univariately estimated inflation
target decreased from 7 p.c. in the late 1970s to about 3 p.c. in the mid 1980s. This is
matched by the disinflationary policy of Paul Volcker, who was appointed president of
the Federal Reserve in 1979. A similar decrease, from about 10 p.c. to about 5 p.c., is
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Figure 4: Smoothed multivariate states (euro area)
Figure 5: Smoothed univariate states (United States)
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Figure 6: Smoothed multivariate states (United States)
observed for the euro area. This decrease is more diﬃcult to match with narrative evidence,
though, as no unified monetary policy existed before 1999. Still, several future euro area
member countries (e.g. Austria, Belgium, France, The Netherlands) were disinflating in the
beginning of the eighties. For the euro area, a second disinflationary period is also present in
the beginning of the nineties. Other future euro area member countries (e.g. Greece, Italy,
Portugal, Spain) were then disinflating in order to comply with the Maastricht criteria. In
the United States there seems to have been a somewhat less pronounced decrease in the
central bank’s inflation target over that period.
In an inflation targeting framework, where the short-term interest rate is the primary
policy instrument, the natural interest rate provides a metric for the stance of monetary
policy. The natural rate of interest varies over time due to shifts in the trend growth
of output and other factors such as households’ rate of time preference. We took these
variations explicitly into account in our model, so that when estimating shifts in the central
banks’ inflation target the results would not be misleading due the shifts in the benchmark,
namely the natural interest rate. From figures 7 and 8 one can see that during the nineties
a decrease in the trend growth rate of the euro area has driven the natural real interest rate,
whereas this does not seem to be the case for the United States. In addition, especially
variations in time preferences have driven the natural real interest rate over the last three
decades in both the United States and the euro area.
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Figure 7: Smoothed multivariate states (euro area)
Figure 8: Smoothed multivariate states (United States)
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Table 5: Half lives of inflation (quarters)
Euro area United States
Temporary inflation shock 1 1
Perceived inflation target shock 8 16
Output gap shock 13 18
Central bank target shock ∞ ∞
4.2.3 Half-life and impulse response analysis
An alternative way of analysing inflation persistence in the multivariate model looks at the
impulse response functions and the so-called half-life of diﬀerent shocks to inflation. The
latter counts the number of periods for which the eﬀect of a shock to inflation remains above
half its initial impact. An important diﬀerence with the point estimates of the respective AR
coeﬃcients is that with this persistence measure diﬀerent sources of persistence in response
to a shock can reinforce each other. The inflation dynamics in response to a shock will thus
not only depend on the persistence in the variable that was shocked, but will also depend on
the interaction with other variables. Therefore, also the persistence in the latter will play a
role.
Table 5 reports half lives for four shocks to inflation considered in the multivariate model.
The half life of a temporary shock (ε1t) is only one quarter. For a shock to the perceived
inflation target (η2t), the half life is 8 and 16 quarters in the euro area and the United States
respectively. For a shock to the output gap (ε3t), the half life even amounts to 13 quarters
in the euro area and to 18 quarters the United States. Finally, a shock to the inflation
target (η1t) is permanent and therefore its half life is equal to infinity. The latter result is
obtained by construction because we assume a random walk process for the shifts in the
central bank’s inflation target. Still, it shows that ignoring a component with an infinite
half life must create a considerable bias in the estimates of the other kinds of persistence.
A similar lesson can be learnt from the impulse response functions in response to a
unit shock in Figures 9-10. Both in the euro area and in the United States a shift in the
central bank’s inflation target (η1t) has a permanent impact on inflation. Still, it takes
various periods before the inflation rate stabilises at the new target. This is to a big extent
due to considerable expectations-based persistence that creates persistent deviations of the
perceived inflation target from the central bank’s inflation target. In case of a shock to
the output gap (ε3t) or the perceived inflation target (η2t), the response of inflation seems
to be characterised by a similar degree of persistence. In case of a temporary shock to
inflation (ε1t), the convergence to the target goes much faster. Intrinsic and expectations-
based persistence measured according to the sum of the AR coeﬃcients are not statistically
significantly diﬀerent. Still, due to the persistence in the reaction of the central bank and
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Figure 9: Impulse responses (euro area)
Figure 10: Impulse responses (United States)
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the output gap, the number of quarters that inflation is aﬀected by a diﬀerence between the
perceived and the central bank’s inflation target can be considerably higher.
The impulse response functions show that the central bank can play an important role
in the adjustment process. The speed and the extent to which the central bank adjusts it
policy instrument will determine the speed at which inflation returns to its target level. In
case of a diﬀerence between the perceived inflation target and the central bank’s inflation
target we modelled the reaction function of the central bank such that it responds more
than in case of deviations from the inflation target caused by other shocks (cf. higher).
Still, the interest rate smoothing is the same for all deviations, implying that the speed -
and not the extent - at which the central bank adjusts its policy instrument is the same. To
accelerate the adjustment to the inflation target a central bank could react more vigorously
to a shock to the output gap or the perceived inflation target compared to a temporary
shock to inflation.
5 Conclusions
This paper aims at measuring diﬀerent sorts of inflation persistence, i.e. the sluggish re-
sponse of inflation in response to diﬀerent macroeconomic shocks. In the literature post
war inflation persistence measures are often found to be close to that of a random walk.
The main point stressed in this paper is that these unconditional estimates are hard to
interpret as the data generating process of inflation can be decomposed in a number of
distinct components, each of them exhibiting its own degree of persistence. First, shifts in
the central bank’s inflation target can induce permanent shifts in the mean inflation rate.
Second, imperfect or sticky information implies that private agents have to learn about the
true central bank’s inflation target. As such, the inflation target perceived by private agents
can persistently diﬀer from the true central bank’s inflation target. Third, persistence in the
various determinants of inflation also introduces persistence in the observed inflation rate.
As the first three sources of persistence typically show relatively high inertia, ignoring one
of them might create an upward bias in measured intrinsic inflation persistence.
Therefore, we measure inflation persistence in a structural time series model which ex-
plicitly models the various components driving inflation. We pursue both a univariate and a
multivariate approach. Extracting information from the central bank’s key interest rate we
find confirmation that shifts in the central bank’s inflation target induce a non-stationary
component in the inflation rate. In addition, slow adjustment of inflation expectations in
response to changes in the central bank’s inflation target and persistence of shocks hitting
inflation are important factors determining the observed inflation persistence. These com-
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ponents explain a large fraction of the high degree of persistence observed in the post-WW
II inflation rate. Taking these components into account, intrinsic inflation persistence is
found to be lower than the persistence of a random walk, i.e. the sum of the AR coeﬃcients
in the data generating process of inflation is estimated to range from 0.45 in the euro area
to 0.8 in the United States.
The implications for monetary policy are as follows. Our evidence indicates that in a
stable inflation regime, where the central bank’s inflation target does not change and where
the public perception about this inflation target is well anchored, inflation persistence is
relatively lower. The results also imply that in the case monetary policy would again give
rise to unstable inflation, it would afterwards be very hard to disinflate due to the slow
adjustment of inflation expectations in response to changes in the inflation target. In the
case of natural rate misperceptions (Orphanides and Williams, 2004) this might however
not be straightforward to avoid.
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Appendix 1: Deriving an empirical specification for inflation expec-
tations
Equation (4) can be derived using a variant of the sticky information model of Mankiw
and Reis (2002) or the signal extraction problem of Erceg and Levin (2003) and Andolfatto
et al. (2002). The diﬀerence between the two models is the way information about the
central bank’s inflation target πTt arrives to the firms. In the sticky-information model,
exact information about πTt is available but not all firms update their information about π
T
t
every period due to for instance information gathering costs. Therefore, aggregate prices
do not respond immediately to changes in πTt . In the model of Erceg and Levin (2003) and
Andolfatto et al. (2002), exact information about πTt is not available. This leads to a signal
extraction problem. Aggregate prices will only respond to changes in πTt once firms have
learned about the new central bank target. If learning is slow, aggregate prices will not
respond immediately to changes in πTt .
A sticky-information model
As in Mankiw and Reis (2002) we assume that firms reset their prices every period, but
infrequently gather information about the central bank inflation target πTt , which is readily
available in every period. The log of a firm’s optimal price p∗t is given by:
p∗t = pt + αzt (A.1)
p∗t = p
P
t−1 + π
T
t , zt = 0 ∀t (A.2)
where pt is the log of the aggregate price level, zt is the output gap and α is a positive
coeﬃcient. This equation says that a firm’s desired relative price rises in booms and falls
in recessions. If we assume that the output gap is always equal to zero, the firms’ optimal
price p∗t will be equal to the aggregate price level pt or the sum of the aggregate price level
pPt−1 in the previous period consistent with the perceived inflation target and the central
bank’s inflation target πTt in the current period.
In this model, only a fraction λ of the firms updates its information about πTt to calculate
a new optimal price. The probability of updating information is the same for each firm, i.e.
independent of the timing of the last update. The other firms continue to set their prices
based on old information about πTt .
A firm that last updated its beliefs about the inflation target j periods ago sets its price
xjt :
xjt = Et−jp
∗
t (A.3)
= pPt−1−j + (j + 1)π
T
t−j (A.4)
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The aggregate price level is the average of the prices of all firms, given by:
pPt = λ
∞X
j=0
(1− λ)jxjt (A.5)
The perceived inflation target can be calculated from (A.5) as:
πPt = p
P
t − pPt−1 (A.6)
= λπTt + (λ− 1) pPt−1 + λ
∞X
j=0
(1− λ)j+1(pPt−2−j + (j + 2)πTt−j−1) (A.7)
Substituting out pPt−j using (A.5) and rearranging yields:
πPt = λ
∞X
j=0
(1− λ)jπTt−j , (A.8)
which is equivalent to:
πPt = (1− λ)πPt−1 + λπTt (A.9)
A signal extraction problem
Both Erceg and Levin (2003) and Andolfatto et al. (2002) assume that monetary authorities
set nominal interest rates in line with their inflation target, πTt , using an interest rate rule.
Observing the central bank’s interest rate, private agents can therefore infer on the central
bank’s inflation target from their knowledge of the central bank’s interest rate rule. An
information problem arrises from the assumption that the interest rate set by the central
bank can shift due to both transitory and permanent monetary policy actions. Transitory
policy actions can be interpreted as (i) deviations from the interest rate rule in response
to various transitory shocks hitting inflation and/or (ii) imperfect control of monetary au-
thorities over the interest rate. Permanent policy actions are shifts in the central bank’s
inflation target πTt . Consequently, private agents must solve a signal-extraction problem
to disentangle transitory and permanent policy actions using shifts in the nominal interest
rate. This can be done using the Kalman filter. This optimal filtering solution gives rise to
a learning rule that resembles adaptive expectations processes.
In particular, we assume that the central bank’s inflation target evolves according to
equation (1) while monetary policy is described by the following interest rate rule:
it = ρ2it−1 + (1− ρ2)
¡
r∗t + π
P
t−1
¢
+ ρ1(πt−1 − πTt ) + ε2t (A.10)
More information on this interest rate rule can be found in section 2. Permanent monetary
policy actions stem from η1t in equation (1) . Transitory policy actions stem from ε2t in
equation (6) . An optimal estimate EtπTt of π
T
t based on the information contained in it can
be obtained recursively using the Kalman filter as:
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EtπTt = Et−1π
T
t−1 − kgνt (A.11)
where υt captures the new information contained in it, i.e. νt = it−Et−1it = ρ1
¡
Et−1πTt − πTt
¢
+
ε2t where for simplicity r∗t is assumed to be a constant r. kg the Kalman gain parameter
that measures the speed at which private agents update their beliefs about the monetary
policy target πTt in response to the new information contained in υt. It is given by
kg =
1
2
σ2η1
σ2ε2
Ã
−ρ1 +
s
ρ21 + 4
σ2ε2
σ2η1
!
(A.12)
Equation (A.12) shows that kg is increasing in the signal-to-noise ratio σ2η1/σ
2
ε2 and decreas-
ing in the reaction ρ1 of the central bank to deviations of inflation from its target.
As from equation (1) we have that Et−1πTt = Et−1π
T
t−1 and setting π
P
t = Etπ
T
t using
equation (2), equation (A.11) can be rewritten as:
πPt = (1− ρ1kg)πPt−1 + ρ1kgπTt − kgε2t (A.13)
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Appendix 2: State Space representations
Univariate model
yt =
£
πt
¤
; αt =
£
πPt π
P
t−1
¤0
; xt =
£
πt−1 . . . πt−q
¤0
;
Z =
£
(1−
Pq
i=1 ϕi) 0
¤
; A =
£
ϕ1 . . . ϕq
¤
; T =
·
2− δ δ − 1
1 0
¸
;
R =
£
δ 0
¤0
; εt =
£
ε1t
¤
; ηt =
£
η1t
¤
; H =
£
σ2ε1
¤
; Q =
£
σ2η1
¤
Multivariate model
yt =
£
πt it yrt
¤0
; xt =
£
πt−1 πt−2 . . . πt−q yt−1 yt−2 it−1
¤0
;
αt =
£
πTt π
P
t π
P
t−1 y
P
t y
P
t−1 y
P
t−2 λt λt−1 τ t τ t−1
¤0
;
A =


ϕ1 ϕ2 . . . ϕq β1 0 0
ρ1 0 . . . 0 0 0 ρ2
0 0 . . . 0 β2 β3 −β4

;
Z =


0 (1−
Pq
i=1 ϕi) 0 0 −β1 0 0 0 0 0
−ρ1 (1− ρ2) 0 0 0 0 (1− ρ2) γ 0 (1− ρ2) 0
0 0 β4 1 −β2 −β3 0 β4γ 0 β4

;
T =


1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
δ (1− δ) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 θ 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0


; R =


1 0 0 0 0
δ 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 1 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0


εt =
£
ε1t ε2t ε3t
¤0
; ηt =
£
η1t η2t η3t η4t η5t
¤0
;
Ht =


σ2ε1 0 0
0 σ2ε2 0
0 0 σ2ε3

; Qt =


σ2η1 0 0 0 0
0 σ2η2 0 0 0
0 0 σ2η3 0 0
0 0 0 σ2η4 0
0 0 0 0 σ2η5


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Appendix 3: Data
• Inflation: quarterly inflation rate, defined as 400(lnPt− lnPt−1), with Pt the sea-
sonally adjusted quarterly GDP deflator. Sources: AWM (Fagan et al, 2005) and
BIS;
• Real output: quarterly ln(GDPt), with GDPt the seasonally adjusted quarterly GDP
in constant prices. Sources: AWM (Fagan et al, 2005) and BIS. The estimated output
gap is expressed in percent deviation of current output from potential output, namely
100 ∗
¡
yrt − yPt
¢
;
• Key interest rate: quarterly central bank key interest rate. Sources: NCB and ECB
calculations and BIS.
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